Abstract: Most of the literature dealing with the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) has ignored the fact that multinational enterprises (MNE) are not stateless and that their activities take place within an international political system: the return on their FDI can be greatly inuenced by the quality of interstate political relations between their home and host countries. This paper investigates whether the quality of interstate political relations between countries inuences the volume of bilateral FDI. Thanks to the construction of a new indicator of the quality of interstate political relations, it is found that better interstate political relations foster bilateral FDI, though the signature of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) may dampen the impact of their uctuations. In addition, the eect of a variation in the quality of domestic institutions increases with the entry into force of a BIT, suggesting that the latter signals the credibility of an institutional improvement. Overall, when both indirect eects are considered, the entry into force of a BIT increases bilateral FDI stocks by 16%, on average, a lower impact than those found in previous studies. This eect nevertheless signicantly diers according to the quality of both interstate political relations and domestic institutions. Résumé: La littérature sur la localisation des investissements directs à l'étranger (IDE) ignore, en grande partie, le fait que les entreprises multinationales ne sont pas apatrides et que leurs activités prennent place dans le système politique international. Leur retour sur investissement peut ainsi être grandement aecté par la qualité des relations politiques entre leur pays d'origine et le pays hôte de leurs investissements. Cet article étudie dans quelle mesure la qualité des relations politiques entre Etats inuence le volume des IDE bilatéraux. En construisant un nouvel indicateur de la qualité des relations politiques internationales, nous montrons qu'entretenir de bonnes relations politiques favorise les IDE bilatéraux. La signature d'un traité bilatéral d'investissement (TBI) limite cependant la pertinence des relations politiques pour les décisions d'investissement. Par ailleurs, l'eet d'une amélioration des institutions domestiques augmente avec l'entrée en application d'un TBI, ce qui suggère que ces accords signalent la crédibilité des institutions domestiques. Dans l'ensemble, lorsque ces deux eets sont pris en compte, l'entrée en vigueur d'un TBI augmente les stocks bilatéraux d'IDE de 16% en moyenne, un impact moins important que ceux trouvés dans les études précédentes. L'ampleur de cet eet varie cependant beaucoup selon la qualité des relations politiques entre Etats et des institutions domestiques.
Introduction
Ulysses, too, saw the value of binding himself to the mast. Constraints on sovereignty are, therefore, the aim of the exercise. In a world of international transactions and multiple jurisdictions, constraints on sovereignty are also desirable. Otherwise, the potential for conict and unpredictability seems almost limitless (Wolf, 2005, p.91) The last century has demonstrated that international economic integration is not an automatic process. Trade barriers fell in the last century only because most countries mutually accepted to do so. Although today trade is regulated at the multilateral level, as attested by the growing importance of the World Trade Organization, international capital ows, especially foreign direct investment (FDI), do not benet from global governance mechanisms which would enforce common rules across the globe. As suggested by Martin Wolf, in the absence of constraints on host country sovereignty, the activities of multinational enterprises (MNE) remain aected both by domestic governance and by the specic bilateral interstate relations between their home and host countries. Hence, in this paper we argue that previous literature has ignored an important determinant of FDI, by implicitly considering that FDI takes place within an international political vacuum, in which the policy choices of host countries are purely domestically driven. By apprehending the policy choices of host countries from an international perspective, this paper further contributes to the literature by providing the necessary framework to understand the eects of bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
Surveys, such as Transparency International (2002), clearly emphasise that, after corruption, diplomatic pressures are an important means for MNE to gain unfair business advantages. More crucially, foreign rms may suer from the retaliatory consequences of deteriorating diplomatic relations between their home and host countries, through various devices of expropriation. Indeed Boehmer et al. (2001) show how valuable linkages, such as FDI, can be instrumentalised in interstate relations. It is therefore likely that foreign investors are very sensitive to the evolution of the quality of interstate political relations, since their deterioration could engender an increase in the risk of seizure of their return on investment in a given host country. On the other hand, an improvement in the quality of diplomatic relations should guarantee MNE a better protection of their property rights. The quality of interstate political relations should inuence the volume of bilateral FDI, along with the quality of the domestic institutional framework. Hence, this paper contributes to existing literature by distinguishing two kinds of political risks: a systemic domestic risk, common to all investors, related to the quality of the domestic institutional framework, and an idiosyncratic risk specic to each pair of home and host countries, related to interstate political relations. Besides, positioning FDI theory into the broader context of interstate political relations provides a framework in which the eect of interstate agreements aiming at regulating investment ows, such as bilateral investment treaties, can be better understood. BITs act as an incomplete mechanism guaranteeing property rights at the supranational level. As such, they should reduce the diplomatic and domestic risks faced by MNE and, by extension, foster FDI.
The link between FDI and interstate political relations has been hardly investigated, due to the lack of information allowing the evaluation of the quality of the latter over the last decades. 1 This obstacle is overcome in this paper thanks to the use of a new database which compiles a high number of recent interstate political interactions. The creation of an indicator of the quality of interstate political relations allows us to estimate their impact on bilateral FDI ows between 30 OECD countries and 62 OECD and non-OECD countries over the 1991-2000 period. It is found that the quality of diplomatic relations exerts a signicant economic impact on bilateral FDI ows. However, its impact can be mitigated through the signature of a bilateral investment treaty. In addition, we nd that the entry into force of a BIT increases bilateral FDI stocks by 16%, on average, after taking into account its indirect eects. This total impact nevertheless varies signicantly according to the quality of both interstate political relations and domestic institutions. Our results are based on a proper specication of the gravity equation, founded on its most recent econometric developments, and are robust to numerous robustness checks. This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the dierent arguments which may explain a causality link between interstate political relations, bilateral investment treaties and FDI. Section 3 describes the indicators used to evaluate the quality of interstate political relations and explains the specication and data used for the empirical estimation. The impact of interstate political relations and BITs on bilateral FDI stocks is then exposed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related literature 2.1 Foreign direct investment and interstate political relations Among the factors which inuence the decision of a MNE to invest in a foreign country, the security of its property rights is particularly valued, because it guarantees the MNE that it will earn its full return on investment (Li and Resnick, 2003) . Property rights must not only be protected against the actions of private agents (individuals or enterprises) but also against the State since it can abuse its monopoly of legitimate violence to expropriate investors in order to improve the welfare of its rulers. The concept of expropriation must be understood in a large 1 Nigh (1985) is one of the few papers in the international business literature to have investigated this subject. He nds that conictual and cooperative diplomatic relationships exert respectively a positive and negative impact on US manufacturing FDI in developing countries. His study is however specic to the diplomatic relationships of the United States, does not account for other FDI determinants, and only covers the particular period of the Cold War (Stulz, 2005 (Stulz, , p.1597 . North and Weingast (1989) show how the Stuarts, rulers of the United Kingdom in the XVII th century, expropriated the private sector thanks to the use of a variety of instruments: new taxes, forced loans rarely repaid, creation of monopoly grants, sale of peerages, purchase of goods below market price, threat of enforcement of forgotten regulations and, ultimately, seizure of private property. These instruments are still of use nowadays among public ocials remains of actuality: Green (2005) reports that when the rulers of Beijing city decided to get involved in the production of vehicles, they issued a regulation stating that only the vehicles produced by the municipality-owned company could use three of the main thoroughfares leading to the city, hindering in this way private (foreign) producers.
It is likely that the degree of expropriation to which investors are confronted depends on their importance, in the eyes of state rulers, and on their specicities. One of the main criteria discriminating investors is their nationality. A government facing a reelection may gain from harming foreign investors if that allows to seduce a greater number of voters. Foreign investors, as informal representatives of their country, may also suer from the degradation of the diplomatic relations between their home and host countries, since their expropriation can be used as a retaliatory instrument in an interstate conict. Indeed, Boehmer et al. (2001) show how valuable interstate linkages, such as FDI, can serve as a costly signaling mechanism. These authors assume a rationalist explanation of war, i.e. that war is the consequence of the inability of two states to reach a negotiated arrangement, due to a lack of information on the preferences of the other.
From this perspective, the ex-ante destruction of mutually valuable interstate economic linkages can be seen as a mean of communication through which disagreeing parties signal their resolve by sending a credible (and costly) signal. By reducing the uncertainty about the preferences of at least one actor, this signal favors the emergence of a peaceful negotiated settlement, without any military ght. International security concerns can thus lead a country to expropriate foreign investors. 2 Hence, MNE should invest less in countries where they are likely to suer from interstate conicts, since the risk of expropriation increases. A contrario, a rise in the quality of diplomatic relations between two countries should foster bilateral FDI, by guaranteeing MNE of both countries a better protection of their property rights.
Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties
The expropriation risk sustained by MNE in the midst of interstate relations is related to the very structure of the international system, in which there is no supranational mechanism guaranteeing the protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts. Countries may favor the partial implementation of such mechanism through the signatures of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which strengthen the protection of foreign investors against the host country's actions of expropriation. In the broad perspective of the international political system, BITs can thus be understood as a mean to reduce the uncertainty related to bilateral interstate political relations.
BITs are signed between two countries in order to reciprocally encourage, promote and protect foreign investment in either country (UNCTAD, 2000) . The nineties have experienced a surge in the number of BITs signed; BITs numbered 2495 in 2005, of which 1891 had entered into force, suggesting that more and more countries see them as a way to increase and protect their FDI outows (gure 1 3 ). The absence of discriminatory treatment against foreign investors, the prohibition of investment performance requirements or the possibility to repatriate prots without delays are provisions regularly included in BITs (UNCTAD, 2000) . More remarkably, many BITs grant foreign investors the right to sue the host government through international arbitration, if actions undertaken by the host government are deemed to be tantamount to expropriation, i.e. a nationalisation or even a regulatory change (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003) . This possibility of resorting to a supranational authority whose decisions are binding on governments is an example highlighting how BITs accord foreign investors a greater protection of their property rights than the one they would enjoy if they could only challenge governmental actions before national courts, which are not always very quick and fair. By giving up the use of retaliatory measures against MNE in a diplomatic conict and accepting some limitation on their sovereignty, signatory governments state their credibility as third-party which secures property rights. 4 With respect to domestic institutions, the desire of a country to trade its sovereignty for credibility (Elkins et al., 2004) can be interpreted in two dierent ways. In a rst case, it can be considered that by signing a BIT, a country indicates that it is determined to oer foreign investors an institutional framework which better secures property rights than the current domestic institutional framework. From this perspective, a BIT acts as a substitute to domestic institutions which are little trusted by foreign investors. In a second case, the signature of a BIT signals foreign investors that a country will not damage the protection of property rights already granted by domestic institutions in order to achieve its national objectives and security choices:
BITs and quality of domestic institutions would then be complementary.
Whatever the true nature of BITs, as substitutes or complements to high-quality domestic institutions, a positive impact of a BIT on the volume of FDI received by a host country from its 3 See http://globstat.unctad.org/html/index.html 4 Elkins et al. (2004) report that the governments of the Czech Republic, Liban and Ecuador had to pay 250, 266 et 70 US$ millions respectively to foreign rms for having expropriated them. This mixed impact of BITs on FDI may have two reasons. First, by relying in most cases on aggregate FDI data, previous studies have obscured the specic impact of a BIT on FDI between two partners. Second, these papers focus on the direct eect of BITs on FDI, omitting the dierent channels through which a BIT may inuence the host country business environment.
Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Neumayer and Spess (2005) are two exceptions, and they reach opposite conclusions. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) nds evidence that BITs are complementary to good domestic institutions whereas Neumayer and Spess (2005) suggest that BITs function as substitutes for good domestic institutional quality. Hence, the existence of this indirect channel of inuence of BITs on FDI remains highly controversial. In addition, the capacity of BITs to dampen the impact on FDI of variations in interstate political relations has been globally ignored. This is not surprising since diplomatic relations remain a missing determinant in the FDI literature. Overall, the total eects of BITs on FDI are unknown and studies nding a positive and signicant impact, such as the 30% eect estimated by Egger and Pfaermayr (2004) , do not give much guidance on the channels through which a BIT increases bilateral FDI.
3 Empirical model and data
It is expected that the quality of interstate political relations exerts an impact on the volume of bilateral FDI, as it inuences the security of property rights enjoyed by foreign investors.
However, in the presence of a BIT, their uctuations may matter less since the host country agrees to grant foreign investors a stronger protection of their property rights by abiding to international rules. In addition, BITs may act as substitutes or complements to high-quality domestic institutions. Finally, maintaining good interstate political relations or signing a BIT with a given partner may exert an externality on FDI originating from other countries. Empirical testing of these four hypotheses will be achieved through the construction of an indicator of the quality of interstate political relations and the use of interaction terms within a gravity model of bilateral FDI.
The quality of interstate political relations
When working on interstate interactions, two types of data are available: qualitative data on armed conicts and quantitative data on daily events. In the rst case, actors, duration, geographical location and intensity of each conict have been dened by researchers. Such eorts can only be undertaken for infrequent interstate interactions of a high intensity like armed conicts.
In the second case, daily events are automatically extracted by computers from wired reports or newspapers and are coded automatically by actors and type of observed actions. In comparison to armed conicts datasets, it is quasi impossible to know whether these data globally pertain to the same united historical case. However data on daily events possess the great advantage of providing information about both conictual and cooperative relations between states, whatever the intensity of the underlying event.
The evaluation of the quality of diplomatic relations between countries is based on a new event dataset, developed by the Kansas Events Data System (KEDS) and made available by Gary King on his website. 5 Computers have been programmed to read the rst sentence of news reports from wire services and to code each event according to the actor, the target, the type of event and the date. King and Lowe (2002) describe in detail this process and provide evidence that computer coding is equivalent to human coding in the short run and more ecient in the long run. The typology of events comes from Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA, see Bond et al. (2003) for a complete description of the coding scheme).
In order to aggregate the daily events compiled in this data set, the level of conict or cooperation embodied in each case needs to be taken into account. The Goldstein (1992) scale allows the transformation of daily interactions into two distinct annual ows of cooperative and conictual interstate political relations. 6 The values attributed to each category of event, reported in King and Lowe (2002) , are indicated in appendix A. This scale gives a score between 0 and +10 (respectively 0 and -10) to each category of event according to the amount of cooperation (conict) embodied in each event case. Both ows of cooperation and conict are then combined into a single net indicator of the quality of interstate political relations (QIR) following the transformation proposed by Pollins (1989) 
where 
where F DI ijt stands for the bilateral stock of FDI in country j originating from country i in year t, C ijt is a vector of gravity-specic variables (distance, contiguity, common language) , ICRG jt is a measure of the quality of domestic institutions, QIR ijt is our proxy for the quality of interstate political relations, BIT ijt is a dummy variable for bilateral investment treaty between country i and j, and ijt corresponds to the sum of four terms: a home country time-invariant xed eect, a host country time-invariant xed eect, a country-invariant time eect and the error term.
It is expected that bilateral FDI ows will be positively inuenced by market sizes, contiguity, common language, quality of domestic institutions, quality of interstate political relations and 6 The mapping of IDEA categories onto Goldstein scale, rst developed for the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS), is available from IDEA's website (http://vranet.com/idea).
7 Such transformation takes into account the interdependence between the level of cooperation and the level of conict.
8 See for instance Wei (2000) or Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) .
7 the entry into force of a BIT. Distance, as a proxy for transaction costs, should exert a negative impact. Finally, the sign of host country wealth is ambiguous since a high GDP per capita is simultaneously correlated with high purchasing power and high nominal wages, each exerting an opposite eect on FDI, positive and negative respectively Shapiro, 2002, 2003 
Quality of interstate political relations
Results are given in table 2. In terms of control variables, from a host country perspective, a large market, good public governance, shared language and contiguity tend to exert a positive impact on bilateral investment, whereas the opposite is true for bilateral distance and GDP per capita. The sign of the latter can be interpreted as reecting the impact of high labour costs.
These results are in line with previous works using the same specication, such as Benassy-Quere et al. (2007) or Head and Ries (2007) . Although the signs and signicance of our control variables 11 See www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods for details on the 22 components of the ICRG composite index.
12 Egger and Pfaermayr (2004) show that a BIT increases signicantly bilateral FDI only if it is actually implemented, underlining that the international commitment of the host country must appear to be credible to foreign investors. Hence, we use the date of entry into force of a BIT rather than its date of signature.
13 http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Startpage____718.aspx are sensitive to the specication used, 14 it is reassuring to note that the coecient of our proxy for the quality of interstate political relations (QIR) is always positive and signicant, indicating that countries entertaining good diplomatic relations invest more in each other. The economic eect is substantial since according to column (6) of table 2, a one standard deviation increase from the mean of the quality of interstate political relations increases the bilateral FDI stock by about 80%. Our results may, however, suer from endogeneity. The causality between FDI and interstate political relations may be bi-directional since according to the liberal peace paradigm, growing economic interdependence fosters better interstate political relations (Polachek, 1980; Russett, 1997, 1999; Barbieri, 2002) . In addition, omitted country-pair specic variables correlated with the quality of interstate political relations, may be the true factor driving the impact 14 The lack of signicance of GDP and GDP per capita may be explained by the inclusion of host and home country xed eects and multicollinearity among these variables (because population varies slowly). of the quality of diplomatic relations on FDI. We deal with each problem consecutively, because no exogenous time-varying instrumental variable for the quality of interstate political relations is readily available and because the inclusion of country-pair xed eects requires panel data.
The rst source of endogeneity, simultaneity, can be accounted for by nding a suitable cross-sectional instrument. However, since even in cross-section we could not nd good external To remedy to the second source of endogeneity, omitted variable, country-pair specic variables which could be correlated with the quality of interstate political relations are included in a rst stage. In column (2), historical ties, i.e. the existence of a colonial relationship and the possibility that two countries used to belong to the same entity, e.g. Czech Republic and Slovakia, military conict occurrence or signature of a regional trade agreement are accounted for.
In a second stage, all time-invariant (unobservable) country-pair characteristics which may aect bilateral FDI, such as cultural proximity, are taken into account by the inclusion of country-pair specic xed eects in column (3), in place of geographic and linguistic bilateral variables and country-specic eects. 16 This is a particularly demanding specication since the impact of the quality of interstate political relations on FDI is only identied through the eect of its changes on FDI over time.
When endogeneity is controlled for, results provided in table 3 conrm our previous ndings as the coecient of the QIR variable always remains positive and signicant. In the instrumental variable (IV) regression reported in column (1), the coecient of the QIR variable remains significant and its magnitude is fairly close to what has been found previously. This is not surprising as a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test conrms the exogeneity of this variable. Results remain unchanged when controlling for additional determinants of bilateral FDI in column (2). It shows that historical ties inuence bilateral FDI but do not drive the eect of the quality of diplomatic relations.
However, in column (3), the coecient of the latter decreases signicantly as the inclusion of country-pair xed eects implies that only the impact of dierences in the quality of interstate political relations on bilateral FDI over time are investigated, leaving out the additional impact of inter-country dierences in the quality level of interstate political relations. Nevertheless, in this demanding specication, the coecient of the QIR variable remains signicant at the 1% level, highlighting the importance of interstate political relations as a determinant of FDI. Together, these modications of our initial specication demonstrate the robustness of the impact of the quality of interstate political relations on bilateral FDI.
4.2 Bilateral investment treaties
To assess the total impact of BITs on FDI, their indirect eects on the host country business environment must be investigated. BITs may directly improve the business climate to which foreign investors are subject. Mostly, they may dampen or reduce the relevance in MNE location decisions of variations in both the quality of interstate political relations and the quality of domestic institutions. The last eect is, nevertheless, ambiguous as BITs may be substitute or complementary to a good public governance. In the latter case, the signature of a BIT can be seen as a costly signal sent by the host country to international investors about its resolution not to resort to retaliatory actions during a diplomatic crisis. In order to account for these indirect eects, interaction terms between the quality of interstate political relations and the existence of a BIT or the quality of domestic institutions are included in our basic specication. In table 4, we introduce consecutively our two interaction variables. The four rst columns present results using country xed eects, and the remaining four present results using country-pair xed eects instead.
The coecient and signicance of the BIT variable depend on whether country-pair xed eects are included (columns (1) and (5)). The fact that the coecient is only signicant in the specication including country-pair xed eects suggests that countries choose well when signing a BIT, as suggested by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) concerning free trade agreements.
For instance, when unobservable characteristics between two countries reduce their bilateral FDI ows, countries will be more likely to sign a BIT if the latter prevents these unobservable characteristics to deter bilateral FDI ows, i.e. if expected gains from signing a BIT are larger.
As mentioned before, bilateral xed eects control for the endogeneity bias related to omitted (unobservable) variables likely to aect both the level of bilateral FDI and the opportunity to enter a BIT. When such factors are taken into account, the eect of a BIT on bilateral FDI stock is positive and signicant (column (5)).
Indirectly, BITs seem to mitigate the impact of the quality of interstate political relations on FDI, as the interaction term between both variables is always signicant and negative across specications (columns (2) and (6)). These ndings imply that the signature of a BIT protects against the risk linked to interstate political relations. On the other hand, the interaction term between the BIT dummy and the quality of domestic institutions is not signicant, whichever the specication used (column (3) and (7)). However, including the BIT dummy and the two interaction terms may be a misspecication if the eect of BIT on FDI is entirely dependent on the quality of both domestic institutions and interstate political relations. In other words, BITs may not have any direct eect and the coecient of the BIT dummy in column (5) Observations  8001  8001  8001  8001  7560  7560  7560  7560  Number of country pairs  1080  1080  1080 1080 Notes: a, b, c denotes respectively signicance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. All variables are in logarithms. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Autocorrelation-robust standard errors in columns (1)-(4).
signicance of the BIT dummy in column (3) and (7) provides support to this hypothesis. Once the BIT dummy is omitted in columns (4) and (8), both interaction terms become signicant and it appears that the impact of a variation in the quality of domestic institutions increases with the signature of a BIT. It suggests that the latter signals the credibility of an institutional improvement, as the host country is less likely to damage the achieved quality of its domestic institutions for retaliation purposes. In appendix B, it is shown that results remain qualitatively unchanged when the ICRG composite risk indicator is replaced by a better proxy of property rights protection, the ICRG political risk indicator or when additional control variables are included (existence of a regional trading agreement, home and host country levels of democracy, 14 membership to the GATT/WTO).
Quantication of the BIT eect
The quantication of the magnitude of the eect on bilateral FDI of the entry into force of a BIT between two countries is not straightforward because of the non-linear nature of our Poisson QMLE procedure and the interaction terms between a BIT and the quality of interstate relations and the quality of domestic institutions, respectively. Ai and Norton (2003) underline that the interaction eect is conditional on the independent variables. We decide therefore to assess the impact of BITs on FDI by simulating the eect of the entry into force of a BIT on the predicted bilateral FDI stocks from our Poisson QMLE model, holding everything else constant.
By computing the predicted bilateral FDI stocks with and without a BIT, we are able to calculate the average eect of the entry into force of a BIT. For this, we use estimates of our preferred specication (column (8) of table 4). We also compute the average eect for dierent categories of country pairs, according to the institutional quality of the host country and the quality of bilateral interstate political relations.
When both indirect eects are considered, the entry into force of a BIT increases bilateral FDI stocks by 16% on average. This eect nevertheless signicantly diers according to the values of the quality of both domestic institutions and interstate political relations (see gure 2).
Corner-eects can be described. On the one hand, a BIT exerts little impact on FDI in a host country getting along well with its partner, whichever the quality of domestic institutions, since good diplomatic relations already guarantee foreign investors the protection of their property rights. Good domestic institutions nevertheless strengthen the credibility of the host country.
On the other hand, a BIT exerts its strongest eects when foreign investors are confronted to recurrent diplomatic disputes as it assures foreign investors that they will not be the subject of retaliation through various devices of expropriation. The strongest impact of a BIT occurs when it clearly signals that the good domestic policies enjoyed by foreign investors are fully dissociated from the negative evolution of bilateral diplomatic relations. Overall, these results support our hypothesis that the purpose for a host country of signing a BIT is to send a costly signal stating its intertemporal credibility to foreign investors facing diplomatic risk.
International externalities
In this section, we investigate whether maintaining good interstate relations or signing a BIT with a given partner exerts any externality on FDI originating from other countries. First, a proxy for the quality of interstate political relations of a host country vis-a-vis all its partners is included. It is constructed as the average of bilateral interstate political relations weighted by the 
Conclusion
Most of the literature dealing with the location of FDI has globally ignored that MNE are not stateless and that their activities take place within an international political system. When investing abroad, the business environment faced by MNE is not only shaped by the quality of domestic institutions: the return on their FDI can also be greatly inuenced by the quality of interstate political relations between their home and host countries. This paper has tried to rem-edy to this omission of the literature by testing the impact of the quality of interstate political relations on bilateral FDI. Empirical results indicate that good interstate political relations positively inuence FDI, although their eect can be mitigated by the eective existence of a BIT.
Through the signature of a BIT, two partner countries reciprocally abandon the use of retaliatory actions against foreign rms and part of their sovereignty in order to credibly signal foreign investors their determination to oer a safe business climate on a long-term basis. In addition, the impact of a variation in the quality of domestic institutions increases with the signature of a BIT, suggesting that the latter signals the credibility of an institutional improvement. Overall, when both indirect eects are considered, the entry into force of a BIT increases bilateral FDI stocks by 16%, on average, a lower impact than the one found in previous studies. The magnitude of this eect nevertheless signicantly diers according to the quality of both host country domestic institutions and interstate political relations. King and Lowe (2002) 20 Appendix B 
